Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1948

Henry Hayward v. J. R. Downing and J. Wayne
Eldredge and Lynn D. Wright v. J. R. Downing and
J. Wayne Eldredge : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Gustin & Richards; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hayward v. Downing, No. 7216 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/946

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Case No. 7216
Case No. 7217

In the Supren1e Court
of the State of Utah
HENRY HAY"\VARD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
J. R. DOWNING and J. \VAYNE

ELDREDGE,
Defendamts and AppeUants,
and
LYNN D. WRIGHT, a Minor, by JESSE
WRIGH'T, his Guardian ad litem,
Plaintiff a;nd Respondent,
vs.
J. R. DOWNING and J. WAYNE
ELDREDGE,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial
District In And For Salt Lake County,
~ta~Utah

F lo+.!)leif&.ltl~ogenson,
l

-~·J
~

Judge

1- 1948

GUSTIN & RICHARDS
'
----~-------------co·-.R~:-u1~~-Atto.rneys for Defendants
QLERK. S'JPHEM£
l>
•
and Appellants.
l-

•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................

1

STATEMENT OF ERRORS RELIED UPON....................................

9

ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................

10

1. The Jury Was Not Adequately Instructed

on the Defense of Assumption of Risk....................................

10

2. The Jury Was Not Adequately Instructed on the
Defense of Contributory Negligence........................................

17

3. The Jury Was Not Adequately Instructed on the
Question of "Express" Consent or Permission,
the ~w of the Case....................................................................

20

4. The Court Failed to Give Any Emphasis to the
Denials of :Plaintiffs' Contention................................................

21

5. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Not
Submitting the Special Interrogatory
To Test the General Verdict......................................................

24

6. The Suggestion By Way of Argument of An
Attractive Nuisance Was PrejudiciaL......................................

25

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Edwards v. Southern Railway Company, 169 So. 715,
106 A.L.R. 1133, Ala...........................................................................

16

Hayward v. Downing, Wright v. Downing, 189 P. (2d)
442, Utah············-··---·-··-········-·---·-···-----------··---·-·····----······-----···············
Herndon v. Salt Lake City, 34 Utah 65, 95 P. 646............................

1
16

Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349................................

27

Kerby v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 264 P. 377, Idaho........................

27

Martin v. Sheffield, 189 P. (2d) 127, Utah............................................

17

Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 39 Utah
236, 115 P. 967....................................................................................

21

Taylor v. Bamberger Electric R. Co., 62 Utah 552,
220 P. 695 --------···--····--·····---······-······-···-·--·····---····---··-······-·-··············-·-

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
HENRY HAYWARD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

J. R. DOWNING and J. \VAYNE
ELDREDGE,
Defentkunts and AppeUants,

Case No.
7216

LYNN D. WRIGHT, a Minor, by JESSE
WRIGH'T, his Guardian ad litem,
Plaintiff (JJJ'bd Respondent,

Case No.
7217

and

vs.

J. R. DOWNING and J. WAYNE
ELDREDGE,
Defendants (JJJ'bd Appellants.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action brought by the plaintiffs to recover
damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the
negligence of the defendants. These cases have previously been before this court. H1ayward v. Downimg, Wright
v. Downing, 189 P. (2d) 442, decided on February 5,
1948. In the previous appeal, both cases having been consolidated as in the instant case, this court held the trial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court to have been in error when it granted a motion of
nonsuit and reversed the judgment of the trial court, remanding the cases for new trial. The two cases are now
before this court upon appeal from judgments entered
upon verdicts, in each instance in favor of the plaintiff.
As pointed out by the court in its former decision,
the two defendants were co-partners ·engaged in the
promotion of wrestling matches for public ·exhibition in
the Coliseum. Building at the State F'air Grounds in S'alt
Lake City, of which building defendants. were •lessees.
Seats for patrons extended in all directions from the
stage, each row of seats being elevated slightly abo~e
the row in front of it. On the east wall of the arena ther·e
was a small platform or alcove about fifteen feet abo~e
the floor and about five feet above the last row of seats,
which were immediately be'low it. There were no ordinary
devices by which customers could reach the platform or
alcove, nor were there any accommodations provided
for the g.eating of patrons thereon. Access to the platform or alcove was gained by the person intending to sit
thereon grasping an overhead iron beam with his hands
and then swinging "Tarzan-like'' on to the platform.
On the evening of April 26, 1946, the date of the accident, the two plaintiffs, with others, were sitting upon
the platform watching the wrestling matches after having
secured, as they testifi·ed, the express permission of the
def·endant Downing to sit there. Both Hayward and
Wright were sixteen years old at the time (Tr. pp. 114,
219). During the progress of the last bout the platform
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collapsed and the two plaintiffs fell to the floor of the
building and were injured. Son1e six ·weeks before the
accident one of the plaintiffs (Tr. pp. 154-155), and some
of the companions of both of the plaintiffs, were sitting
upon the platform when the weight of the same was increased by the addition of two individuals, strangers to
the boys. The platform sagged a few inches on this occasion whereupon the strangers left the platform but
the bo}-s remained on the same throughout thwt particular
·evening and continued to sit there upon subsequent occasions until the platform collapsed during the evening
of the day in question.
In the previous appeal the court held tha;t the plaintiffs occupied the status of "invitees" as to the platform, the court ruling as follows:
"B1-t·t when one ·Of thje· defendants expressly consented that plaintiffs sit upon the platform, the
invitation was broadened to include the platform,
at least as to plaintiffs. We do not wish tro be understood as holding tha.t in .every case whene an
invitee as to one part of the premises receives
permissrvon to go ·upon ·another part of the premiSies, he thereby becomes am invitee as to such
seco.nd ~part. Our holding is limited strictly to
the facts ·of this case-where an invitee as to one
part of the premises, receives permission to go
upon another part of the premises in furtherance
of the object or purpose for which he was originally invited upon the premises (in this case, to view
the wrestling matches) he becomes an invitee as to
such second part of the premises. As to other
and different fact situations, we express no opinion. '' (Italics ours).
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In the re-trial, and properly so, the foregoing rule
was accepted as the law of the case wHh the main factual
situation centering about the question as to whether or
not the defendants, and particularly the defendant Downing, gave the boys expr,ess permission to sit upon ,the
platform. Counsel in his opening statement (Tr. p. 110)
stated that the proof would show that the boys sat on
the platform "with the express consent of Mr. Downing
that they could sit up there." The complaint in the
Hayward case ( Tr. p. 2) aHeges that the plaintiff ''was
directed by the defendant J. R. Downing to sit upon said
s t:age or platform,'' and in the Wright case the complaint (Tr. p. 6) makes the same allegation, and which
allegations were by the answers in ,each case denied (Tr.
pp. 21-32, 34-3'6). In view of the errors to he hereafter
assigned we think it important to keep in mind that an
issue was raised as to whether or not the boys were sit1ing upon the platform with the exp.ress consent or permission of the defendant, and particularly in view of the
previous decision of this court.
1

Aside from the genera1 denials, the answers in both
case's, by way of affirmative defense, raise the issue of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk. In thes,e
particulars it is alleged that ther,e were ample seats provided for patrons but that nevertheless the plaintiffs
voluntarily, and upon their own initiative, elected to and
did sit upon the plaltform; that the platform was not a
place provided for the s,eating of patrons nor for the
seating of the plaintiffs but had been constructed by
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parties unknown to the defendants long prior to defendants' lease of the premises for decorative purposes, and
not at any tin1e intended for the purpose of seating or
accon1n1odating patrons; that the plaintiffs gained access
to the platform not by 1neans furnished by the defendants
but by the unusual and unnatural method of being lifted
by companions and drawing themselves up a portion of
the way mth their arms and elbows ; that the plaintiffs
at the time alleged in their respective complaints knew
or in the exercise of reasonable car~e, caution and circumspection should have known the hazards, if any, involved
in sitting or standing upon the platform, at which time
the plaintiffs and each of :them were trespassers and not
guests or invitees of the defendants and that the plaintiffs assumed all of the risks and hazards, if any, in connection with their presence upon the platform.
In support of the denials and affirmative allegations of the answers, the defendant Downing testified
that the boys had not asked for permission to sit on the
platform; that the orders to everyone were to the effect
that no one be permitted to sit there (Tr. pp. 356-357);
that he did not know that the boys were sitting on the
platform that e¥ening and that his orders ·were to keep
them out of the alcove or off the platform at all times
(Tr. p. 361). To the same effect was the testimony of
the defendant Eldredge (Tr. p. 365), who also testified
that after the p latform collapsed two of the boys, including the plaintiff Hayward had the appearance of
having been drinking (Tr. p. 366). Ernes't E. Morris, a
1
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spectator at the wrestling matches on the night in question and at the time the floor collapsed, testified that he
saw boys in the alcove and during the evening he heard
a dis turbance ''stamping of feet and one thing and another" from the alcove (Tr. pp. 298-299). Walter J.
Lewis, one of the defendants' employees, testified that
he knew both Hayward and Wright and that on a prior
occasion the boys had asked him for permission to sit in
the alcove "I told them no, they couldn't do it. They
said, 'We would see Mr. Downing'; and they went to see
Mr. Downing and he positively said 'No'; and I a'lways
talked to l\Ir. Downing, and he said, 'By all means keep
them off from up there'." (Tr. p. 300); that the boys
themselves had come to the conclusion that it was better
for then1 not to get up there ( Tr. p. 306), and that people
were not permitted to sit in the alcove at any time (Tr.
p. 310).
1

E. F. Adams, the ticket taker for the defendants during the month of April1946 (Tr. p. 310), saw the Hayward boy and another boy wrestling on the platform on
the night in question and just as one of the bouts had
finished one of the boys raised the other's hand as a
token, and as the witness turned to get an officer to put
the boys down he heard the crash (Tr. p. 311), and that
people were never allowed to sit on the platform (Tr.
p. 313). Arthur D. Murphy, a police officer for Salt Lake
City for s'ome thirty-six years (Tr. p. 317) and privately
employed by the defendants for policing the wrestling
matches (Tr. p. 318), testified that he allowed no one
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to sit on the platform and that on several occasions he
got boys do,vn fron1 there, including the two plaintiffs (Tr. p. 318); that on the night of the accident and
earlier in the evening before the platform collapsed he
ordered Eugene Logan, one of the plaintiffs' companions,
off the platform, who at the time was impudent and
rude. Just before the crash the witness' attention was
directed to the back of the building on account of some
commotion and when he got back into the other portion
of the building the platform had collapsed (Tr. p. 319).
He testified that immediately after the accident he observed the condition of the boys and observed that they
(Christensen and Hayward, Tr. p. 324) had been drinking (Tr. p. 320); that the boys had been ordered from the
platform on other occasions and had always got down
(Tr. p. 325).
Joseph L. Sloan, an employee of Salt Lake City, a
patron of the wrestling matches attending approximately
ninety per cent of all of the events but not present on
the night in question, testified to have personally
"chased" people from the platform (Tr. p. 332). Vern
F. Johnson, likewise a patron and at the arena on the
night in question, saw Officer Murphy order the boys
off the platform and then saw the boys get back again
just before the platform collapsed (Tr. p. 336). Grant
Pitts, a patron on the night in question, observed boys
on the platform before the collapse arguing with Officer
Murphy who told them to ge't down, which they did ('Tr.
p. 339), and saw other boys or the same boys return to
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the platform during an intermission (Tr. p. 340). Darwin
Steadman, an usher, saw three or four boys on the platform scuffling amongst themselves. The boys had been
ordered down, the rule of the house being tha't no one
could sit upon the platform and that it was the witness'
duty to see to the seating of patrons (Tr. p. 343). Sidney
Neslen, a student at the University of Utah and a patron
of the wrestling matches, attempted to sit on the platform sometime between the date of January 7, 1946
and March 12th of that year when he was ordered down
by a fireman and later by an usher. (Tr. p. 353).
The Wright and Hayward boys were from Bountiful and attended the wrestling matches with young
companions from that place, calling themselves the
"Bountiful crowd". The Bountiful boys were the only
ones that testified to having obtained permission from
Mr. Downing to sit on the platform. The trial court, notwithstanding the testimony of disinterested witnesses
as to what actually occurred on the night in question
with respeet to the boys having been ordered off the platform and with respect to the general practice in that regard, refused to submit an interrogatory to the jury to
be used in connection with the general verdict, the interrogatory being so framed as to require a yes or no
answer to the question "Did either one of the defendants tell the plaintiff or his ·companions that he, the
said plaintiff or said companions, might sit on the platform or alcove on the night the accident occurred~" (Tr.
p. 71). The trial court did not consistently submit the
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question of the alleged express consent or permission for
the boys to sit upon the platforn1, limited the application
of the rule of contributory negligence and refused to
submit the issue of assumption of risk and permitted,
over objection, plaintiffs' counsel to argue the responsibility of a proprietor who maintains an attractive nuisance on his premises, a theory not contemplated by the
pleadings or proper from the proof. These, in the main,
are the questions to be determined upon this appeal.
STATEMENTS OF ERRORS RELIED UPON

1. The court erred in not submitting to the jury the
question of assumption of risk (Requested Instructions,
9 Tr. p. 68; 10 Tr. p. 69; 11 Tr. p. 70; all refused. Exception p. 389) .
2. The court erred in not consistently instructing
that plaintiffs had the burden of proving express consent
to sit where they did (Requested Instruction 7 refused
Tr. p. 66. Exception Tr. p. 388).
3. The court erred in its instruction on contributory
negligence and in refusing to instruct as requested (Instruction Tr. p. 50; Requested instructions 3 Tr. p. 62; 4
Tr. p. 63. Exception Tr. p. 388).
4. The court erred in failing to instruct on defendants' theory that consent or permission was not given to
the plaintiffs to sit where they did (Requested Instruction 8 Tr. p. 67. Exception Tr. p. 388).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5. The court erred in refusing to submit a speciai
interrogatory to the jury, to be returned in connection
with its general verdict, inquiring as to whether or not
either one of the defendants told the plaintiff or his companions that he, the said plaintiff, or his companions
might sit on the platform or alcove on the night the accident occurred (Requested Instruction 12 Tr. p. 71. Exception Tr. p. 389).
6. The court erred in permitting plaintiffs' counsel to argue before the jury to the effect that it was
negligence on the part of the defendants to permit the
opening in the wall known as the alcove to remain there
as an inducement for boys of the ages of fourteen, fifteen and sixteen to sit, and upon being so requested to
fail and refuse to instruct the jury that that was not an
issue in the case (Argument, request and exception Tr.
pp. 384-386).

7. That the court erred in overruling and denying
defendants' motions for new trial (Motions Tr. pp. 8083, 390-395. Ruling Tr. p. 396).
8. The verdict and judgment thereon in each of
the cases is not supported by but is contrary to the evidence.
ARGUMENT

The assignments of error and the various propositions involved group themselves for argument as follows:
1. The Jury Was Not Adequately Instructed On The
Hefense Of Assumption Of Risk.
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From the fact that the boys, according to their testimony, requested permission from ~Ir. Downing on each
evening that they attended the bouts to sit in the alcove,
it can reasonably be inferred that they were conscious
of possible hazards in so doing. The Bountiful boys, and
particularly the plaintiff Hay·ward, were on the platform and in the alcove several weeks before the accident
when the floor of the same "bent in a 'little" (Tr. p. 154)
when additional weight was added.

'' Q. But it was the floor that started to give way
in one corner; is that it¥
A. Yes." (Tr. pp. 154-155).
The witness Lewis testified:

'' Q. Did the boys ever tell you Mr. Downing had
told them they could, or couldn't sit up there¥
A.

They agreed not to go up there, after I told
them.***

A.

Well, they oonte to the conclusion it was better for them not to get up there. They felt as
though it wasn't safe at the time. They
weren't the only boys we had to keep down.
And finally we had to go to Mr. Murphy and
have Mr. Murphy come and help make them
get off there.'' ( Tr. pp. 305-306).

The witness also testified:

'' Q. Did I understand you to say that the boys
asked you if they could talk to Mr. Downing¥
A.

Yes, they asked me: I told them to see Mr.
Downing.

Q. What happened after that¥
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A.

I wouldn't let them up there. They said, 'It
is funny you won't let us up there'. They said
'We got word from Mr. Downing'. I said,
'By all m·eans boys, it is not safe'." ('Tr. p.
305).

Both answers (Tr. pp. 31-36) raised the issue that
the plaintiffs assumed the risks arrd hazards, if any, in
connection with their presence upon the platform. Specific instructions on that theory were requested as follows:
'·'DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO.8.
You are instructed that, if you find from the
evidence in this case that the alcove or platform,
where plaintiff was sitting or standing, was constructed for some purpose other than for patrons
to sit or stand upon and that plaintiff was not
given permission to sit there, and you further
find that plaintiff was injured by reason of some
matter not known to the defendants, or either of
them, your verdict shall he for the defendants and
against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF ACTION."
(Tr. p. 67).
"DEFENDANT'S' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO.9.
You are instructed that, if you find that the
.plaintiff did not obtain permission to occupy the
alcove or platform where he was sitting, then you
are instructed that he assumed all risk of injuries
arising from the use of the platform or alcove, and,
therefore, your verdict shall be for the defendants and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF
ACTION." (Tr. p. 68).
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''DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
xo. 10.
You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence in this case that the alcove or platform
where plaintiff was sitting or standing was constructed for some purpose other than for patrons
to sit or stand on, and that plaintiff was not
directed to sit or stand there but did so of his
own choice, he assumes the risk which may attach
to such place, and if his injuries were caused by
reason of the fact that said place was not properly
constructed for patrons to sit and stand on, then
your verdict shall be in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF ACTION." (Tr. p. 69).
"DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
NO. 11.
You are instructed that if one voluntarily
takes a place, which is more dangerous and
hazardous than the place or location generally
provided for patrons, he assumes the risk incidental to such hazards and if his injuries are
caused by reason of his taking the more hazardous
place, then your verdict should be in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE
OF ACTION." (Tr. p. 70).
The foregoing instructions were refused. All that the
court said on the subje·ct was in connection with its
Instruction No. 1 where it summarized the issues (Tr.
p. 44) omitting any reference to the subject in its further
instructions.
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The distinction between contributory negligence and
assumption of risk is pointed out in the case of TayZor
v. B01mberger Electric R. Co., 62 Utah 552, 220 P. '695:,
where the court stated:
H The questions, therefore, for this court to
determine are: Did plaintiff's acts and conduct,
as stated by himself, constitute contributory negligence per se, and did he assume the risk as matter
of law~ In this connection we desire to state that
the question of assumption of risk is here discussed for the reason that in this case that issue
was presented by the pleadings and the district
court submitted it to the jury in connection with
the issue of contributory negligenoe. Anything
that is herein said on the question of assumption
of risk is limited to the facts and circumstances
of this case, and we do not now pass upon the
question of whether, as betwe,en a common carrier and a passenger, that defense is ordinarily
available to the carrier and, if so, to what extent.

As pointed out by this court in Kuchenmeister
v. L.A. & S. L. R. R. Co., 52 Utah, 116, 172 Pac.
725, there is a clear distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of r!sk. It has,
however, also often been held that under certain
circumstances the same acts or conduct may make
one guilty of contributory negligence and also give
rise to the def,ense of assumption of risk.
The undisputed facts and circumstances, according to the authorities to which we shall hereinafter refer, clearly bring this case within the
doctrine just stated. In view of plaintiff's statements, there is not a shadow of doubt that he
acted with full knowledge of all the circumstances
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surrounding him and that all that he did in the
premises was done deliberately and with full appreciation of the danger to which he exposed himself. True, he Inay not have anticipated the lurching or swaying of the cars; hence it is contended
that because the lurching of the cars was due to
the defendant's negligence plaintiff did not assume the risk. It no doubt is true that under ordinary circumstances a passenger will not be held
to have assumed a risk arising out of a carrier's
negligence. In this case, however, the circumstances are extraordinary. Here the defendant
had provided the plaintiff with a reasonably safe
place in which he could have he·en safely carried
to his destination. He, of his own volition and
through intelligent choice, left the place where
he was safe and chose one that was extremely
dangerous. It might just as weH be con tended
that although plaintiff had ·chosen to ride on the
trucks under the cars and was injured by reason
of the lurching of the cars, his conduct did not
constitute contributory negligence, and that he
did not assume the risk, since the lurching was
caused by reason of a defect in the track which
the defendant, in the exercise of that high degree
of care which the law imposed on it, should have
prevented.''
The Taylor case, supra, is not a case involving the
relationship of master and servant, in which class of
cases the doctrine of assumption of risk is most frequently applied. That the doctrine is applicable in an action
between persons not master and servant or not having
relations by contract with each other, where the plaintiff
knew and appreciated the danger and voluntarily put
himself in the way of it, is recognized in the 'Taylor case
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and in the case of Edwards v. 8outhern Railway Company, 169 So. 715, 106 A.L.R. 1133 (Ala.) where the court
stated:
''In the case of McGeever v. 0 'Byrne, 203
Ala. 266, 269, 82 So. 508, the phrase 'assumption
of risk' is fully considered, and it is there noted
that the expression is som-etimes loosely applied
to cases where there was no contractual relation
between the parties. 'The rule declared is, that
it must be confined to cases where the plaintiff
knew and appreciated the danger assumed, and
with such knowledge and appreciation voluntarily
put himself in the way of it.''
The uncontradicted testimony is that for some period
of time the plaintiffs knew that the platform would sag
or become loosened by reason of weight placed upon it;
that they had been expressly warned that it was not safe
and that they had concluded that it was not a safe or
proper place for them to sit. Applying the doctrine of
assumption of risk, and in view of the uncontroverted
testimony, then it would follow that as a matter of law
the plaintiffs should not be entitled to recover. At least
the issue became one that the jury should have considered upon proper instruction stating and setting forth
the law applicable to the facts in issue. This the court
did not do. That it should have done so is fundamental,
as stated in Herndon v. Salt Lake City, 34 Utah 6'5, 95
P. 646:
"Instructions should in all cases apply the
law to the existing facts and circumstances, and
in cases of negligence, where the duty varies with
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the conditions, a mere general statement of the
law with regard to the duty generally imposed is,
if possible, worse than not to instruct at all."
The mention of assumption of risk in outlining the
issues, in Instruction No. 1, the lack of reference to it in
Instruction No. 2 where it is stated without reference to
the particular defense of assumption of risk ''the defendants have the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence the contributory negligence, if any, of
the plaintiff", and no further reference throughout the
instructions brings the case, we believe, within the rule
announced by this court in JJfartin v. Sheffield, 189 P.
(2d) 127, decided February 3, 1948, where the eourt held:
"Such instruction, uneluciated in any other
part of the charge, might well be construed by
the jury to mean that though the jury found negligence on the part of plaintiff which proximately
contributed to the accident, nev·ertheless plaintiff
was entitled to a verdict.
Viewing the instructions as a whole, we conclude that the court failed, although requested by
defendant to do so, to advis·e the jury as to the
effect of alleged negligence on the part of plaintiff should it find that such negligence proximately contributed to her own injuries. This was prejudicial error.''
2. The Jury Was Not Adequately Instructed On The
Defense Of Contributory Negligence.
The court refused Defendants' Requested Instruction No.3 (Tr. p. 62), which reads as follows:
"You are instructed that, if you find that
the plaintiff by his acts or conduct other than
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1nerely sitting upon the platform caused, or in
any manner, no matter how slight, contributed to
the accident, he cannot recover and your verdict
must be in favor of the defendants NO CAUSE
OF ACTION."
The court modified Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 4 (Tr. p. 63) which, as requested, read as follows:
''You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence there was scuffling, wrestling, or playing
on the alcove or platform, and that such ·conduct
on the part of plaintiff or his companions caused
or contributed to the giving away of the alcove
or platform floor, then you are instructed that
your verdict must be in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF ACTION.''
The modified request is found in Instruction No. 7
(Tr. p. 50) as follows:
''You are instructed that if you find by a
preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff engaged in scuffling, or wrestling on the alcove or
platform, and that such oonduct on the part of
~plaintiff was what 1a re1
aS1ovroably prudent pers1on
would not have done under the facts and circumst,ances then and there existitng and proximately
caused or contributed to the giving away of the
alcove or platform floor, then you are instructed
that your verdict must be in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause of action."
The vice of the requested instruction given as modified
is the language inserted by the court, emphasized above
by italics.
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The theory upon which the cases were t~ied, measured by the law of the case as announced in the former
appeal, would not permit the plaintiffs any greater latitude under the status of invitees than that of sitting upon
the platform for the purpose of viewing the wrestling
bouts. To permit the jury to measure the plaintiffs' conduct while on the platform under the rule of conduct of
that of a ''reasonably prudent person'' while doing something beyond the express permission granted goes beyond
the law of the case and permits something more than the
express permission contemplated. As the instruction was
requested the abuse of the express privilege allegedly
granted, making the plaintiffs invitees rather than trespassers, was stressed, the abuse being that of scuffling,
wrestling or play on the platform; then that conduct in
view of the circumstances of the case, if su~h conduc-t
caused or contributed to the giving way of the platform,
would be contributory negligence. And indeed it might
well be argued that such conduct would in turn remove
the plaintiffs from the status of invitees. In any event,
as a matter of law, the jury should have been instructed
that if in fact the boys were scuffling, wrestling or playing on the platform and that that conduct caused or contributed to the giving away of the platform, they were
guilty of contributory negligence, hut the court went further and permitted the jury by the instruction given to
apply the reasonably prudent person rule notwithstanding the limitations of the ,express permission the defendants allegedly gave, which in turn this court has held
to be the only thing that placed the plaintiffs in the
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status of invitees. The instruction as given contains the
same fundamental objection as the instruction in the
Martin case, supra, and that is it "might well be construed by the jury to mean that though the jury found
negligence on the part of plaintiff which proximately
contributed to the accident, nevertheless plaintiff was
entitled to a verdict.''
3. The Jury Was Not Adequately Instructed On The
Question Of "Express" Consent Or Permission, The Law Of
The Case.
In the previous appeal and as heretofore pointed out
the court held: ''But when one of the defendants expressly consented that plaintiffs sit upon the platform, the
invitation was broadened to include the platform, at
least as to plaintiffs.'' In Instruction No. 2 the court
omitted the expression "express permission", likewise
in Instructions No. 4 and 5. The only place where the
term ''express permission'' was used is found in that
portion of Instruction No. 7 which reads :

"You are instructed that before the plaintiff
can recover in this action he must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was given
express permission to sit upon the place where
he says he was sitting on the night of the accident.
It is not sufficient that the plaintiff, or his companions, sat on the platform as a matter of custom or practice, or of their own volition, or even
with the knowledge of the def-endants, or either
of them, and if, therefore, you find that the plaintiff was not given express permission to sit where
he did, then your verdict shall be in favor of the
defendants and against. the plaintiff, no cause of
action." (Tr. p. 50).
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The court refused Defendants' Requested Instruction X o. 7, which reads as follows :
''You are instructed that a request by the
plaintiff to sit where he did is not the sam,e as a
direction to sit there. The plaintiff, before he can
recover in this action, must show that he was
directed to sit where the accident occurred.'' (Tr.
p. 66).
The plaintiffs testified to sitting upon the platfonn on a number of previous occasions and having seen
others do likewise. Whether or not express permission
was obtained on previous occasions on behalf of the
plaintiffs and others is debatable, but the court should
not have been uncertain in the use of the expression
''consent or pennission'' in view of the previous holding
of the court, which holding centered the status of invitee about the term "express" permission.
In Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 39
Utah 236, 115 P. 967, the court holds:
''The former decision became and is the law
of the case, and this court, as well as the litigants,
are bound thereby.''
From the whole of the charge it cannot help but appear that the court disregarded the significance of the
term ''express" consent and failed to give it proper
emphasis consistently as the law of the case throughout
the instructions.
4. The Court Failed To Give Any Emphasis To The
Denials Of Plaintiffs' Contention.
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Requested Instruction No. 8, which the court refused, was as follows:
"You are instructed, if you find from the
evidence in this case that the alcove or platform,
where plaintiff was sitting or standing, was constructed for some purpose other than for patrons
to sit or stand upon and that plaintiff was not
given permission to sit there, and you further
find that plaintiff was injured by reason of some
matter not known to the defendants, or either of
them, your verdict shall be for the defendants
and against the plaintiff NO CAUSE OF ACTION." (Tr. p. 67).
The requested instruction was on the theory that
the jury might well disregard as unreliable the testimony
of the Bountiful boys and find that the express permission or consent relied upon was not in fact extended
to them, in which event then the court as a matter of
law could say that the evidence fell short of establishing
liability as against a trespasser or mere licensee, requiring the verdict of no cause of action. That theory, by
way of instruction, was not separately stated nor clearly
pointed out to the jury. What suggestion was made on
that score was hidden in other instructions and comingled
with other matters so as to result in a situation where
the defense of denial was for all practical purposes entirely unelucidated in the charge, the criticism that the
court found with the charge in the Martin case, supra.
Instruction No. 1 states that the defendants in each
case denied ''the said allegations of each of the plaintiffs", the only reference to denials in that instruction.
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Instruction X o. 2 states that the plaintiff has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant Downing gave permission to sit in the alcove.
Instruction No. 3 defines burden of proof and preponderance of the evidence. Instructions No. 1, 2 and 3 are
so-called stock instructions. Instruction No. 4 emphasizes
the fact that defendants admit the plaintiffs paid an
admission fee to see the wrestling matches, and the plaintiffs contention that they had the permission of the defendant Downing to sit in the alcove, stating ''this the
defendants deny". The instruction then proceeds to state
that if it is found from a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiffs did have permission, then they were
guests and the defendants owed the duty of exercising
reasonable care. The instruction unnecessarily emphasizes the payment of an admission fee, emphasizes the
guest relationship and minimizes, so far as language
by implication can do so, the significance of the defendants' denial that permission was given. Instruction No.
5 is subject to the same criticism while Instruction No.
6 states that if the plaintiffs chose to sit at a place not
ordinarily provided for patrons, and a place where they
were not given permission to sit, the defendants would
owe them no duty of inspection or otherwise to keep the
place in a safe condition for the seating of patrons, but
the instruction does not go further and state the legal
effect of the want of permission so far as the ~law applicable to the facts in the instant cases is concerned.
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Instruction No. 7 is as close as the court came to
stating the legal effect of the lack or want of express
permission for the boys to sit where they did, but it will
be noticed that several independent subjects are treated
in the one instruction. In fact the court included in Instruction No. 7 nearly all of the few requests that it gave
on defendants' theory. In fairness we do not believe it
can be said that the court gave proper emphasis to the
significance of the want or lack of express permission,
even in Instruction No. 7. None of the other instructions
have anything whatsoever to do with the matter.
5. The Court Abused Its Discretion In Not Submitting
The Sp·ecial Interrogatory To Test The Gene~ral Verdict.

By Requested Instruction No. 12 (Tr. p. 71) the
defendants asked the court to submit the fO'llowing:
''You are instructed that in connection with
your general v·erdict in this case, whether it be
for the plaintiff or whether it be for the defendants, that you are required to answer the following question or interrogatory:
Question: Did either one of the defendants
tell the plaintiff or his companions that he, the
said plaintiff, or his companions, might sit on
the platform or alcove on the night the accident
occurred1·
Answer:--The foregoing interrogatory shall be answer·ed either yes or no, and 6 of the jurors concurring may make answer to the interrogatory by
the foreman.''
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We appreciate that under Section 104-25-2 ·U.C.A.
1943 the granting of a request such as the above is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. The opinion of
this court in the formal appeal makes the matter of express consent the outstanding and controlling fact in the
whole case. As we have heretofore pointed out, the instructions of the court do not emphasize the matter of
the existence or lack of express consent and the fact that
the trial court refused the special interrogatory emphasizes the misconception that the court must have had
of the previous ruling, the law of the case. Special interrogatories and findings to test the sufficency of the
general verdict should be encouraged and the useful purpose thereof in the administration of justice is apparent
in a great number of cases but in the instant matter and
where the appellate court has reversed and remanded for
new trial, pointing out a controlling factual situation,
most certainly it would be an abuse of discretion, where
discretion is permitted, for the court not to give proper
emphasis to the same. It can well be said that the controlling factual situation was camouflaged by a mass of
verbiage concerning maters incidental to the crux of the
situation. We submit that under the circumstances it
was an abuse of discretion not to submit the requested
interrogatory, and here again we call attention to the
fact that there was testimony of severa'l disinterested
witnesses on the main point in issue.
6. The Sugg,estion By Way Of Argument Of An Attractive Nuisance Was Prejudicial.
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The record on this point is as follows:
"MR. GUSTIN: First, your Honor, might we
make a record of what occurred, during the
closing argument of the plaintiff, the argument being made by Judge Tanner.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. GUSTIN: Where he stated, in substance
and effect, that it was negligence on the part
of the defendants to permit the opening on
the wall known as the alcove, to remain there
as an inducement for boys of the age of
fourteen years, or thereabouts, to sit. I believe I have stated the substance of what Mr.
Tanner stated.

I

·THE COURT : That in substance is right, is it
not~

MR. TANNER:

Fourteen, fifteen and sixteen.

MR. GUSTIN:
sixteen.

All right, fourteen, fifteen and

And that thereupon, the defendants, by
·counsel, asked the court to instruct the jury
that that element was not one of the issues
in the case, and the court stated that the jury
had been instructed as to the elements in
the case, and that that was sufficient. I think
that is the substance.
THE COURT: I believe I said, Mr. Gustin, if
my recollection is right, that the issues in
the case were set forth in the instructions,
and that the jury were the sole judges of the
facts, and the court would let it stand at
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In Jensen v. Utah Ry. Oo., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349,
it was held:
'·In this jurisdiction, arguments to the jury
are made after, and not before, the charge of the
court.
For purposes of arguments to the jury, counsel, of course, are required to accept the charge
and yield obedience to it, and are not permitted
to argue against it. So, when counsel in effect
argued that one of the parents was negligent,
whether for the purpose of showing that such
negligence was the sole and proximate cause or
a concurring cause of the injury, he, because of
the charge, was not within his rights, though the
argument may have been entirely in good faith.
We of course recognize a wide scope and great
liberality in arguments of causes to a jury. But
here the court clearly withheld from the jury all
questions of negligence of the parents for any and
all purposes. In such case, on timely objections,
as here made, to permit arguments, either directly or indirectly, with respect to such questions,
tends to mislead the jury. While ·the court eliminated some of the argument, he ought to have
eliminated the whole of it, bearing on the subject, and ,erred in not doing so.''
In Kerby v. Oregon Short Line R. Oo., 264 P. 377
(Idaho), the court said :
''An attorney should confine his arguments
to the issues and the evidence adduced, and to inferences which can legitimately he drawn therefrom, and not go outside the record in an effort
to prejudi·ce the rights of the opposing party.''
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The prejudicial effect of counsel's statement is
readily apparent in a case of this kind. To suggest that
the attractive nuisance theory of liability exists in the
instant matter is to depart entirely from plaintiffs'
theory that they were not trespassers but were invitees.
'There was nothing in the proof nor is there anything
in the pleadings that would justify counsel's statement.
What he said was c;learly beyond the theory of the case
and the instructions of the court. The statement was undoubtedly calculated to prejudice the jury against the
proprietor of wrestling bouts who had accepted an admission charge. To be able to say without admonishment
that the defendants were negligent in permitting the
opening in the wall, lmown as the alcove, to remain there
as an inducement for boys sixteen years of age and
under to sit could not help but confuse the jury as to
the true issues involved. The trial court was given an
opportunity to instruct the jury that the matter suggested was not an element in the case and for the court
to disregard the request and to state that the issues in
the case were as set forth in the instructions, and that
the jury were the sole judges of the facts, could not
possibly have cured the situation. The effect of the statement, coupled with the failure of the court to act upon
being requested, was to permit counsel to go outside of
the issues of the case, to depart from the instructions of
the court and to suggest a theory of absolute liability, and
thatforprejudice
isby to
be presumed.
we bycontend
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CONCLUSION

Regardless of the sympathy that one might have for
the unf~rtunate situation of the plaintiffs, the defendants were entitled to have their side of the case fairly
and impartially presented to the jury with the law applicable thereto. \Vhen one considers the instructions as
a whole, the failure of the trial court to crystallize the
one controlling fact that was in issue through the medium
of the special interrogatory, the over-reaching of counsel
in his argument into a realm of absolute liability without
restraint in a case where by the very nature of it, emotions and prejudice play such an important role, then
we say that the errors committed, a:ll added together, result in a situation where a fair trial was not had on matters peculiarly within the province and under the control of the court itself. The judgments appealed from
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN & RICHARDS,
Attoff"neys {ior Defendants
and Appellants.
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